University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

12-18-1969

People v. Hood
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
1 Cal.3d 444

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

370

462 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Cal.

82 Cal. Rptr. 618
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
David (elth HOOD, Defendant
and Appellant.

Cr. 13651.

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Dec. 18, 1969.

Defendant was convicted in .the Superior Court, Napa County, F. Leslie Manker, J., assigned by the Chairman of the
. Judicial Council, of assault with a deadly
weapon upon a police officer and assault
with intent to murder officer, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Traynor, C.
J., held that evidence of defendant's intoxication should not be considered in determining whether he committed assault with
a deadly weapon on a police officer or any
of lesser assaults included therein.
Reversed.
Opinion, Cat.App., 78 Cal.Rptr. 1, vacated.
I. Criminal Law cg::::,S24(4)

Trial ~ourt must instruct the jury on
general principles of law relevant to issues
raised by evidence, even though not requested to do so, but need not instruct on
its own motion on specific points developed
at the trial.
2. Criminal Law cg::::,S24(3)

Where instruction on lesser included
offenses would be supported by evidence
but is not requested, failure of court to give
such an instruction on its own motion is
error; overruling People v. Bailey, 142 Cal.
434, 76 P. 49; People v. Hite, 135 Cal. 76,
67 P. 57; People v. Franklin, 70 Cal. 641,
11 P. 797; People v. Smith, 223 Cal.App.
2d 225, 35 Cal. Rptr. 719; People v. Calderon, 155 Ca1.App.2d 526, 318 P.2d 498; and
People v. Williams, 141 Ca1.App.2d 849, 297
P.2d 759.
3. Criminal Law cg::::,S24(3)

Where evidence in prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace

officer was suffiCient ,to raise question
whether officer had become angered and
ceased to become engaged in performance
of his'duties or whether defendant could
rea'sonably nave so believed, it was error
fo; co'urt to' fail to instruct on lesser indu'ded offense 0f assault with a deadly
weapon on its own motion.
4. Assault and Battery cg::::,85

Evidence of defendant's intoxication
should not be considered in determining
whether he cOn1mitted assault with a deadly
weapon' on a police officer or any of lesser
assaults included' therein; disapproving
People v. Fanning, 265 Ca1.App.2d 729, 71
Ca1.Rptr. 641. West's Ann.Pen.Code, §§
242, 243, 245 (b) .

•
Kelvin L. Taylor, Palo Alto, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant:'
. Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Robert R.
Granucci, John T. Murphy and Jerome C.
Utz, Deputy Atty.' Gens., for plaintiff
indre~pondent.

TRAYNOR, Chief Justice.
.An indictment charged defendant in
Cpunt I with assault with a deadly weapon
upon a peace officer, Alfred Elia (Pen.
~ode, § 245, subd. (b», in Count II with
battery upon a peace officer, Donald Kemper (Pen.Code, §§ 242, 243), and in Count
III with assault with intent to murder Of. ficer Ella (Pen. Code, § 217). A jury found
him guilty on Counts I and III and not
guilty on Count II, and' the trial court entered judgment on the verdicts. The trial
collrt also ordered that "Defendant shall
serve the sentence in Count Three only
* * * as th~ sentence in Count One
* '* . * withheld arid wilt only be imposed if the sentence for Count Three. is
not cat-ried Qut for any reason. * * *"
Defendant appeals.

is

On September 11, 1967, at about 2 ;00 a.
m., defendant, his brother Donald, and a
friend, Leo Chilton, all of whom had been
drinking for several hours, knocked on the
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door of the house of Susan Bueno, defendant's former girlfriend, and asked if they
could use the bathroom. Susan said no,
but defendant forced his way in and started
to hit her. He knocked her to the floor and
kicked her. Donald Hood then took Susan
aside, and defendant, Chilton, and Gene
Saunders, a friend of Susan's who was
staying at the house, went to the kitchen
and sat down.
Gilbert A. Nielsen, Sus~n's next-door
neighbor, was awakened by the sound of
Susan's screams and called the police. 9fficers Elia and Kemper responded to. his
call. After talking to Nielsen, they went
to Susan's house, knocked on the door,
which was opened by Stella Gonzales, Susan's cousin, and asked if "Susie" was
there. Miss Gonzales said, "Yes, just a
minute," and in a few seconds Susan came
running to the door crying. Officer EIia
asked Susan if she had been beaten and
who did it. She pointed to the kitchen and
said, "They're in there right now." The
two officers walked through the living
room, where Susan, Susan's seven-year-old
son Ronnie, and Stella remained, and went
into the kitchen. There they observed defendant on the right-hand side of the room
leaning against a door. On the left side of
the kitchen, the three other men were
seated at a table. Officer Elia walked to
the middle of the room and qt1estioned the
men at the table. Defendant interrupted
the questioning and asked Officer Elia if he
had a search warrant. Officer Elia replied
that he did not need one since the person
who rented the house had given him permission to enter. Defendant then directed
a stream of obscenities at Officer Elia,
who tt1rned and, according to his testimony,
started to place defendant under arrest for
a violation of Penal Code section 415 (using
vulgar, profane, or indecent language within the presence or hearing of women or
children). He got no further than to say,
"Okay fella, you are * * *," when det. "Every person who commits

lili assault
upon the person of another with a deadly
weapon or instrument or by any means

fendant swung at him with his fist. When
Officer Kemper attempted to go to Officer
Elia's assistance, Donald Hood jumped on
him from behind. During the ensuing
struggle, Officer Elia fell with defendant
on top of him in a corner of a pantry adjoining the kitchen at the rear. While
struggling on the floor, Officer Elia felt
a tug at his gun belt and then heard two
shots fired.
A third officer, Laurence Crocker, who
had arrived at the house shortly after the
other two officers, came into the kitchen as
the scuffle between Officer Elia and defendant was beginning. After he had control of Donald Hood: he looked across the
kitchen. and saw defendant with a gun in
his right hand. He testified that defendant
pointed the. gun towards Officer Elia's. midsection and pulled the trigger. twice.
Both Officers Crocker and Kemper testified that after the shots, defendant's arm
came up over his head with the revolver
in his hand. The struggle continued into
the. bathroom. Defendant was finally subdued when Officer Elia regained possession
of the gun and held it against the side of
defendant's neck. Officer Elia then noticed
that defendant had shot him once in each
leg~

The foregoing evidence is clearly- sufficient to stlpport the verdicts.
Defendant contends that the court failed
properly to instruct the jury with respect
to lesser included offenses to the offense
charged in Count I, and that it also erred in
instructing on the effect of intoxication
with respect to the offenses charged in
both Counts 1 and III.
The court instr·ucted that "The offense
of assault with a deadly weapon, with
which defendant * * * is charged in
Count One of the indictment necessarily includes the lesser offense of assault." This
instruction incorrectly referred to the crime
charged merely as assault with a deadly
weapon (Pen.Code, § 245, subd. (a» 1 inof force likely to Produce great bodily
injury is punishable * * *."
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stead of assault with a deadly weapon upon
a peace officer (Pen.Code, § 245 .. subd.
(b)).2 It thus served to blur the distinctions between these two offenses. Moreover, the court did not instruct the jury
that assault with a deadly weapon upon a
peace officer includes the lessser offenses
of assault with a deadly weapon as well as
simple assault, or that the jury could convict defendant of no more than assault with
a deadly weapon, if it found that Officer
Elia was not engaged in the performance
of his duties or that defendant neither
knew nor reasonably should have known
that he was so engaged. As instructed, the
jury could only convict defendant of simple
assault or assault with a deadly weapon
upon a peace officer. Defendant, however,
did not request an instruction that he could
be found guilty of the lesser offense of assault with a deadly weapon. Accordingly,
the question presented is whether the court
erred in failing to give stich an instruction
on its own motion.
[1] The general rule is that the trial
court must instruct the jury on the general
principles of law relevant to the issues
raised by the evidence, even though not
requested to do so, but need not instruct on
its own motion on specific points developed
at the trial. (People v. Wilson (1967) 66
Ca1.2d 749, 759, 59 Cal. Rptr, 156, 427 P,2d
820; People v. Jackson (1963) 59 CaL2d
375, 380, 29 Cal.Rptr, 50S, 379 P.2d 937;
People v. Bevins (1960) 54 Cal.2d 71, 77,
4 Cal.Rptr. 504, 351 P.2d 776; People v.
Wade (1959) 53 Cal.2d 322,334, 1 Cal.Rptr.
683,348 P.2d 116; People v. Putnam (1942)
20 Cal.2d 885, 890, 129 P.2d 367; People
v. Warren (1940) 16 Ca1.2d 103, 116-117,
104 P.2d 1024. See People v. Martin (1919)
44 Ca1.App, 45, 185 P. 1003; People v.
Stirgios (1913) 23 Cal.App. 48, 136 P.
957; People v. Rogers (1912) 163 Cal. 476,
484, 126 P. 143 (first statement of the rule
2. "Every person who commits nn nssnult
with a deadly wenpon or instrument or
by any menns likely to produce grent
bodily injury upon the person of a pence
officer or fireman, and who knows or
reasonably should know thnt such victim.

in substantially its present form); People
v. Olsen (1889) 80 Cal. 122, 128--129, 22 p,
125 (rule implied in dictum).) In People
v. Wade, supra, we pointed out that the
"general principles of law governing the
case" are "those principles of law commonly or closely arid openly connected with
the facts of the case before the court." As
we indicated in Wade, the rule is designed
to afford protection against the inadvertence of trial counsel.
[2] As the Court of Appeal noted in
People v. Cooper (1968) 268 A.CA. 12,
14-19, 73 Cal.Rptr. 608, the cases establishing this general rule are in conflict
with another line of cases that hold that
it is not error for the court to fail to instruct on lesser included offenses on its
own motion, even though such an instruction would be supported by the evidence.
(People v. Bailey (1904) 142. Cal. 434, 76
P.49; People v, Rite (1901) 135 Cal. 76,
67 P. 57; People v. Franklin (1886) 70
Cal. 641, II P. 797; People v. Smith (1963)
223 CaJ.App.2d 225, 237, 35 Ca1.Rptr. 719;
Peoplev. Calderon (1957) 155 Ca1.App.2d
526, 530, 318 P.2d 498; People v. Williams
(1956) 141 Ca1.App.2d '849, 853, 297 P.2d
759,) We believe that there is no basis
for such an exception to the general rule.
Accordingly, to the extent that the foregoing cases support a special rule. for
lesser included offenses, they are overruled.
We must therefore determine whether
the distinction between assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace officer and assault
with a deadly weapon is a principle of
law "commonly or closely and openly connected with the facts of the case before
the court" (People v. Wade, supra), and
whether the evidence in this case clearly
indicated that Officer Elia might not have
been engaged in the performance of his
duties or that defendant might not have
is a pence officer or fireman engaged in
the performance of his duties, when such
peace officer or fireman is engaged in
tlie p'eri~rmance of his duties shall be
punished '" .. "'."
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known or had reason to know that he was
so engaged.
[3] The officers were in uniform and
defendant had reason to know the,y were
lawfully present in the house to investigate
a disturbance. If there was no evidence
that Officer Elia exceeded the scope of
his duties the distinction between the two
offenses ~ould not be a sigQificant issue.
There was stIch evidence, however. Defendant testified that as Officer Elia turned
and came toward him, he thought the officer was drawing his gun and was going
to shoot him. This evidence was sufficient
to raise the question whether Officer Elia
had become angered and ceased to be engaged in the performance of his duties"
or whether defendant could reasonably
have so believed. Indeed, it was this very
evidence that raised the issue of self-defense, on which the court instructed fully.
Thus, the issue whether the officer exceeded the scope of his duties, or whether defendant reasonably believed he had, was
"closely and openly connected with the
facts" before the court, and it was therefore
error for the court to fail to instruct on the
lesser included offense of assault with a
deadly weapon. Moreover, that error was
prejudicial, for it deprived defendant of
his constitutional right to have the jmy
determine every material issue presented
by the evidence. (Peopk v. Graham (1969)
71 A.C. 320,327, 78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455
P.2d 153; People v. Mosher (1969). 1 Cal.
3d 379. 389, 390, 82 Ca1.Rptr..)79, 385-.1R6,
./61 1'.2<1659, 665-666.)

There is no merit in the contention that
in rejecting the defense of self-defense the
jury must have rejected the evidence that
Officer Elia exceeded the scope of his
duties. The court instructed the jury that
"Where a person seeks or induces a quarrel
which leads to the necessity in his own
defense of using force against his adversary, the right to stand his grottnd and thus
defend himself is not immediately available to him, but, instead he must first decline to carryon the affray, must honestly
endeavor to escape from it, and must fair-

1y and clearly inform his adversary of his
desire for peace and of his abandonment
of the contest. Only when he has done
so will the law justify him in thereafter
standing his ground and using force upon
his antagonist." The court also instructed
the jury that "If an assault with the fists
is being made on a person, but without intent to kill or to do great bodily harm, and
if the assault is not likely to produce great
bodily injury, and if the one thus attacked
is not deceived as to the character of such
an assault, he is not justified in using a
deadly weapon in self defense." The jury
could have rejected the defense of selfdefense under either of these instructions
without reaching the question whether Officer EIia exceeded the scope of his duties
by initiating an assault upon defendant, or
the question whether defendant reasonably
so believed. Under the first instruction
the jury could have found that defendant
sought or induced a quarrel by the stream
of obscenities directed at Officer Elia and
thereafter failed to seek to withdraw from
the fray, thus forfeiting his right to defend
himself. Under the second instruction the
jury could have found that at the time defendant seized the gt1n, he should have
realized that the officer's assault upon him
did not justify the use of a deadly weapon.
Under either of these hypotheses, defendant
could still be not guilty of assault with a
deadly weapon upon a peace officer within
the meaning of subdivision (b) of section
245 if Officer Elia exceeded the scope of
his duties by responding to defendant's insults with excessive force, or if defendant
reasonably so believed. (People v. Curtis
(1969) 70 A.G. 360, 370 n. 9, 74 Ca1.Rptr.
713, 450 P.2d 33.) '''Ie note in fairness to
the trial court that its failure so to instruct the jury was justified at that time
by such decisions as People v. Baca (1966)
247 Ca1.App.2d 487, 495, 55 Cal.Rptr. 681
(subsequently disapproved in People v. Curtis, supra, p. 368 n. 6, 74 Cal.Rptr. 713,
450 P.2d 33).
The judgment must also be reversed as to
Count III, for the court gave hopelessly
conflicting instructions on the effect of in-
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toxication. 3 Although the court correctly
instructed the jury to consider the evidence
that defendant was intoxicated in determining whether he had the specific intent to
commit murder, it followed that instruction with the complete text of CAL]IC No.
78 (revised), which applies to crimes that
require proof only of a general criminal
intent. The court in no way made clear
to the jury that the latter. instruction did
not apply to the charge of assault with
intent to commit murder. The gi~ing of
such conflicting instructions with respect to
a crime requiring proof of a specific intent is error (People v. Spencer (1963) 60
Cal.2d 64, 87, 31 Cal,Rptr. 782, 383 P.2d
134; People ~. F~rd (1964) 60 Cal2d
772, 796, 36 dl.Rptr. 620; 388 P.2d 892;
People. v. Arriola (1958).164 Ca1.App.2d
430, 434,.435, 330 P.2d 683). That error
was clearly p~ejudicial in this case.. There
was substantial evidence that defendant was
3, The' court instructed:
"To constitute the crime of !lssault
with intent to commit murder there must
exist an assault and, in the mind of the
perpetrator, a specific. 'preconceived in.
tent to kill a human being.
"In a crime such as that of which
. defendant, DAVID KEITH HOOD, is
charged in Count Three of the indictment, there must exist a union or joint'
operation of act or' conduct and a cer·
tain. spocific intent.
.
"In the crime of Assault With Intent
to Commit Murder (Penal Co(le Section
217), there .must exist in the mind of
the' perpetrator the specific intent to
. murder a human being, and unless such
intent so exists that crime is not committed.
"In' the crime of assault with intent
to commit murder of which the defend-.
ant, DAVID HOOD, is accused in count
III of the indictment, a necessary ele-.
mont is the existence in the mind of the
defendant of the specific intent to commit murder.
"If the evidence shows" that the de·
fendantwas intoxicated at the' time of
the alleged offense, the jury should con·
sider his state of intoxication in determining if defendant had such specific intent.
"Intoxication of a person is voluntary
if it results from his willing partaking
of any intoxic~ting liquor, drug or other
substance wheil. he knows that it is eapa·

drunk. He testified that he was not aware
that he ever had the gun in his possession
or fired it. Its discharge during the scuffle
could be reconciled with an intent to kill,
an intent to inflict only bodily injury, or
with no intent to fire it at all. Had the
jury not been given conflicting instructions
on the significance of defendant's intoxication, it is reasonably probable that it
would have reached a result more favorable
to defendant on Count III. (People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299
P.2d 243.)
To guide the trial court on retrial, we
consider the question of the effect of intoxication on the crime of assault with a
deadly weapon.
Many cases have held that neither assault
with a deadly weapon nor simple assault is
a speci fic intent crime:' A number of these
ble of an intoxicating effect or when he
willingly assumes the risk of that effect
as a possi bility.
"Our law provides that' 'no act eom·
mitted by a person while in a state of
voluntary intoxication is less criminal by
reason of !lis having bc<!n in such· con·
dition.'
"This means that drunkenness, if the
evidence shows that the defendant was
in such a condition when allegedly he
committed the (a)· crime .charged, is not
of itself a defense in this case. It may
throw light on the occurrence and aid
you in determitling what took place, but
wluin a person in a state of intoxication,
voluntarily produced by himself, commits
a crime such as that (any of those)
charged against the defendant in this
Case, the law does not permit him to use
his own vice as a shelter against the
normal legal consequences of his con·
duct."
4. People v. McMakin (1857). 8 Cal. 547,
548; People v. Marseiler (1886) 70 Cal.
98, 11 P.503; People v. Franklin
(1886) 70 Cal. 641, 11 P. 797; People
v. Leyba (1887) 74 Cat 407, 409, 16
P. 200; People v. Wells (1904) 145 Cal.
138, 140, 78 P. 470; People v. McCoy
(1944) 25 Cal.2d 177, 194, 153 P.2d 315;
People v. Sanchez (1950), 35 CaI.2d 522,
526-528, 219 P.2d 9; People v. Price
(1908).9 Cal.App. 218, 221, 98 P. 547;
People v. Stephens (1916) 29 Cal.App.
616, 622, 157 P. "570 (opinion of Supreme
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cases held that an assault with a deadly
weapon could be predicated on reckless, as
well as intentional, conduct. "'Where the
act is both unlawful and wrongful, and well
calculated to inflict serious personal injury,
the law will imply malice, and an unlawfl.!l
intention and override any actual intention
existing in the mind of the aggressor.
Thus, while it is not an assault to fire
a gun in the air for the purpose' of frightening another, it is an assault, without regard
to the aggressor's intention, to fire a gun
at another or in the direction in which
he is standing .. The law will not tolerate
stich a reckless disregard for human life.'''
(People v. Peak, supra, 66 Ca1.App.2d 89~,
901, 153 P.2d 464, 467, quoting from 4 Am.
Jur., § 6, p. 130.) "[Pen.Code § 245J
provides that 'Every person who co"mmits
an assault· * * * with a deadly weapon
or instrument or by any means or force
likely to produce great bodily injury/ .is
guilty of that offense. The intention to
actually injure another is not mentioned in
that section. * * * If a rifle is delibe'tately and unlawfully fired toward another
person in a manner 'likely to produce great
bodily injury,' an ~ssault with a deadly
weapon may be accomplished even if the
Court appended in denying petition for "
hearing); People v. Mendez (1924) 67
Cal.App. 724, 228 P. 349; People v.'
Lopez (1927) 81 Cal.Apll. 199, 253 P.
169; People v. Lim Dum Dong (1938).
26 Cal.App.2d 135, 78 P.2<1 1026; People
v. Bumbaugh (1941). 48 Cal.App.2d 791,
796, 120 P.2d 703; Pcoplev. Schmidt
(1944) 66 Oal.App.2d 253, 256, 152 P.2d
1021; People v. Peak (1944) 66 Cal.
App.2d 894, 901, 153 P.2d 464; People
v. Oorlett (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 33, 5455, 153 P.2d 595; People v. Duncan
(1945) 72 Cal.App.2d 423, 164 P.2<1 510;·
People v. Griffin (1949, Peters,J.) 90.
Cul.App.2d 116, 1~0-121, 202I;'.2d 573:;
People v. Ingram (1949) 91 CaI.ApI).2d
912, 914,206 P.2d 36; People v. Thompson (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 780, 209 P.2d
819; People v. Walker (1950) 99 Cal.
AllP.2d 238, 242, 221 P.2d· 287; People
v. IJaya (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 7,. 15,
266P.2d 157; Peopley. flwansb(jr{l
(1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 831, 837, 19 Cp.l.
Rptr. 527; People v. Finley (1963).219
Cal.App.2d 330, 340, 33 Ca1.Rptr. 31;
People v. Herd (1963) 220 CaI.App.2d·.

Cal.
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defendant does not really intend to hit the
victim." (People v. Corlett, supra, 67 Cal.
App.2d 33, 54-55, 153 P.2d 595, 605.) (See
also People v. Vasquez (1927) 85 Cal.App.
575,259 P. 1005.)
The first clear signs of doubt that an
assault with a deadly weapon was not a
specific intent crime are found in People
v. Carmen (1951) 36 Ca1.2d 768, 228 P.2d
281. The defendant was convicted of first
degree murder and assault with intent to
murder. As to the murder charge, he contended that he stumbled as he approached
the car in which his victim was sitting and
that the gun was discharged accidentally.
The trial court refused to give an instruction on manslaughter, although requested
to do so by both parties. In reversing the
murder conviction, this court stated (p. 775,
228 P.2d p. 286) :
"If the act committed by defendant was
unlawful but did not amount to a felony
then his crime would be manslaughter.
The unlawful act would fall short of assault with a deadly weapon, Penal Code,
§ 245, or even assault, Penal Code, § 240
if the jury chose to believe his testimony
that he had no intent to kill or injure any847. 850,34 Cal.Rptr. 141; People v.
Sandoval (1963) 222 Cal.App.2(1 348,
351, 35 Cal.Rptr. 227; People v. CIa·
born (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 38, 42, 36
Ca];Rptr. 132; Newman v. Larson (1964,
Burke, J.J. 225 Cal.App.2d 22, 24, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 883; Peoplev. Gaines (1966) 247
Ca1.App.2d HI, 148, 55 Cal.Rptr. 283;
People v. Wright (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d
762, 766-767, 66 Cal.Rptr. 95; People v.
Morrow (1969) 268 A.C.A. 1029, 10391044, 74 Cal.RJltr. 551. Seli 4 Am.Jur.,
Assault and Battery, § 6, p. 130; 6 Am.
Jur.2u Assault and Battery, §§ 13-20,
pp. 21-24; Fricke, Cal.Oriminal Law
(8th cd.) p. 186; 1 Witkin, CIlI.Crimes
(1963) pp. 249-250. But, as to the presence of some confusion, compare 3 Cal.
Jur., Assault and Battery, § 14, pp. 197198 with id., § 19, p. 203; and see 5
CaI.Jur.2d, Assault and. Battery, § 4, pp.
304-307; 92 A.L.R.2d. 635. At least one
early case implies that assault requires
the specific intent to injure. People v.
Douel (1888) 77 Cal. 293, 294, 19 P.
484.
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One. This follows from the definition of
an assault as 'an unlawful attempt, coupled
with a present ability, to commit a violent
injury on the person of another.' Penal
Code, § 240; One could not very well 'attempt' or try to 'commit' an injury on the
person of another if he had no intent to
cause any injury to such other person.
Assault with a deadly weapon is nothing
more than an assault where there is used
either a deadly weapon or any means of
force likely to produce 'great' bodily injury. Penal Code, § 245. The crime here
involved, if defendant's testimony is accepted as true, would seem to be a misdemeanor. 'Every person who,' except in selfdefense, in the presence of any other person, draws or exhibits any firearm, whether
loaded or unloaded,. or any other deadly
weapon whatsoever, in a rude, angry or
threatening manner, or who in any manner,
unlawfully uses the same in any fight or
quarrel is guilty of a misdemeanor.' Penal
Code, § 417."
The opinion then expressly disapproved
the cases that had held reckless conduct
to be a sufficient basis for assault. (People v.Peak, supra, 66 Cal.App.2d 894, 153
P.2d 464; People v. Corlett, supra, 67 Cal.
App.2d 33, 153 P.2d 595; People v. Bumbaugh, supra, 48 Ca1.App.2d 791, 120 P.2d
703.)
Carmen was followed in People v. Wilson (1967) 66 Ca1.2d 749, 759, 59 Cal.Rptr.
156, 427 P.2d 820. Subsequently, in People
v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 221-222, 60
Ca1.Rptr. 457, 469, 430 P.2d 15, 27, we said,
"[D] efendant testified at trial that he had
no intention of harming or killing anyone
and that he at no time aimed his gunshots
at any person identifiable by him as such.
It would seem clear that if defendant's testimony on this point were believed by the
jury, it could not properly find violations
of section 217 Or section 245, subdivision
(b), of the Penal Code, for basic to the
indicated varieties of aggravated assault is
the crime of simple assault. 'An assault is
an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present
ability, to commit a violent injury on the
person of another.' (Pen.Code, § 240.)

'One could not very well "attempt" or try
to "commit" an injury on the person of
another if he had no intent to cause any injury to such other person. * * *' (People v. Carmen [citation omitted].) Even
if the jury had been instructed as to section 834a of the Penal Code, it is clear that
a breach of the duty of submission [to ar~
rest] imposed by that section, absent any
intent to cause injury to a police officer,
could not result in aggravated assault of
the varieties here charged."
It should be noted that the opinion in

Coffey did not tlSe the words "specific intent," and that the opinion in Carmen,
after the language quoted above, continued
with the statement (p. 776, 228 P.2d p. 286) :
"It is true that in assault cases intent need
not be specific-to cause any particular
injury and it may be implied from the act,
People v. McCoy, 25 Ca1.2d 177, 153P.2d
315, but the intent is a question for the
jury."

Carmen, Wilson, and Coffey have given
rise to directly conflicting opinions in th~
coqrts of appeal. In People v. Fanning
(1968) 265 Ca1.App.2d 729,734,71 Ca1.Rptr.
641, 644, the court declared, "In spite of
occasional statements to the contrary * *,
we think it now settled that assault is a
specific intent crime. * * *" (Citing
People v. Carmen, People v. Coffey, and
People v. Wilson, supra; People v. Wheeler
(1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 522, 525, n. 4, 67
Cal. Rptr. 240; People v. Corson (1963) 221
Ca1.App.2d 579, 581, 34 Cal.Rptr. 584. See
also, People v. Roshid (1961) 191 CaLApp.
2d 692, 693-694, 12 Cal.Rptr. 794.) On the
other hand, People v. Morrow, supra, 268
A.C.A. 1029, 1044, 74 Ca1.Rptr. 551, 561,
expressly rejected the Fanning conclusion
and held that assault with a deadly weapon
"does not require proof of a specific intent
to harm the victim but relies upon the
general rule that what was done by [defendant] shows that harm was intended by
the aggravated assault."· The Morrow
court reviewed many of the earlier cases
and decided that sttch an overwhelming line
of authority could not be considered over-
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ruled merely by implication from Carmen,
Wilson, and Coffey.
The distinction between specific and
general intent crimes evolved as a judicial
response to the problem of the intoxicated
offender. That problem is to reconcile two
competing theories of what is just in the
treatment of those who commit crimes
while intoxicated. On the one hand, the
moral culpability of a drunken criminal is
frequently less than that of a sober person
effecting a like injury. On the other hand,
it is' commonly felt that a person who voh11l~
tarily gets drunk and while in that state
commits a crime should not escape the con~
sequences. (See Hall, General Principles
of Criminal Law (2d ed. 1960), p. 537.)
Before the nineteenth century, the com~
mon law refused to give any effect to the
fact that an accused committed a crime
while intoxicated. The judges were ap~
parently troubled by this rigid traditional
rule, however, for there were a ntimber of
attempts during the early part of the nineteenth century to arrive at a more humane,
5. In 1819 Holroyd, J., held in a murder
case that, while voluntary drunkenness
could not be an excuse, it should be considered in determining the issue of premeoitation. (Rex v. Grindley; quoted in
Rex v. Carroll (1835) 7 C. & P. 14,5, 113
Eng.Rep. 64.)
In Hegina v. Cruse
(1838) 8 C. & P. 541, 173 Eng.Hep. 6io;
a case of assault with intent to murder,
the court instrueted thc jury that gross
intoxication might disprove the intcntion
required for the aggravated offense.
With respect to it similar charge in Regina v. l\lonkhouse (1849) 4 Cox C.C. 55,
Coleridge, J., said that the burden was
on the accused to show that his intoxication prevented him from using self-restraint or took away from him ""the
power of forming any specific intention."
This opinion was apparently the first
to use the words "specific intention."
"As if by accident, the 'sjlecific inten·
tion' was seized upon as the importnnt
criterion. Yet the wording of Coleridge,
J.'s summing-up shows that he did not
mean to weave nny particular magic with
these words. This is obvious when he
directs the jury in ]J[onkho1tSe to make
'a proper assessment of both act and
mind: 'To ascertain whether or not {the
lack of power to form any specific in462 P.2d-241/,
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yet workable, doctrine.5 The theory that
these judges explored was that evidence of
intoxication could be considered to negate
intent, whenever intent was an element of
the crime charged. As Professor Hall
notes, however, such an exculpatory doc~
trine could eventually have undermined the
traditional rule entirely, since some form of
mens rea is a requisite of all but strict li~
ability offenses. (Hall, Intoxication and
Criminal Responsibility, 57 Harv.L.Rev.
1045, 1049.) To limit the operation of the
doctrine and achieve a compromise between
the conflicting feelings of sympathy and
reprobation for the intoxicated offender,
later courts both in England and this country drew a distinction between so-called
specific intent and general intent crimes.
Specific and general intent have been
notoriously difficult terms to define and ap~
ply, and a number of textwriters recom~
mend that they be abandoned altogether.
, (Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law,
supra, p. 142; Williams, Criminal LawThe General Part (2d ed.1961) § 21, p. 49.)
Too often the characterization of a partic~
tention] did exist in this instancc, you
must take into consideration the quantity
of spirit he hao taken, as well as his
_'lJccific conduct.'
Surely the adjective
'sriecific' simply means that the accused's
actions, men ttll processes and motives,
that is, all the circumstances of the case,
should be evaluated by the jury and viewed subjectively." (Beck and Parker, The
Intoxicated Offend(lr-A Problem of Responsibility, 44 Can.Bar.Hev. 563, 578.)
Subsequent English cases of the nineteenth century diu not stress Coleridge's
phrase, but exploreu the general thesis
that intoxication was relevant to the"
issue of Intent. Thus, In Regina v.
Bentley (1850) 14 J.P. 671, the court
stated that "the question of drunkenness
is a fact which, among otllers, the jury
may take into consideration in endcavuriug to ascertain the intent." In a form
morc akin to the present rule (Pen.Code,
§ 22), Stephen, J., told the jury in R.
v. Doherty (1887) 16 Cox C.C. 463,
"when the crime is such that the intention of the party committing it is one of
its constituent elements you may look at
the fact that n mnn was in drink in COllsidering whether he formed the intention
necessary to constitute the crime."
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t!1ar crime as one of specific or general
Even if we assume ,that the presence or
intent is determined solely by the presence absence of words clearly denoting mental
or absence of words describing psychologi- activity is a valid criterion for determining
cal phenomena-"intent" or "malice," for the significance of intoxication, OUf present
example-in the statutory language of de- problem is not resolved. The difficulty
fining the crime. When the definition of a with applying such a test to the crime of
crime consists of only the description of a assatllt or assault with a deadly weapon is,
particular act, without reference to intent that no word in the relevant code: provisions
to do a' further act or achieve a future con- unambiguollsly denotes a particular mental
sequence, we ask whether the defendant in- element, yet the word "attempt" in Penal
tended to do the proscribed act. This in- Code section 240 strongly suggests goal-ditention is deemed to be a general criminal rected, intentional behavior.6 This uncerintent. When the definition refers to de- tainty acc,ollrits'for tne to"rlfHct over whethfendant's intent to do some further act or' er assalllt'is"a crime only of intention or
achieve some additional consequence, the ; 'also' of recklessness.
crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.
,We need ~ot reconsider our posltLOn in
There is no real di fference, however, only
Carmen that an assault cannot be predicated
a linguistic one, between an intent to do
merely on' reckless conduct. Even if asan act already performed and an intent to
sault requires an intent to commit a battery
do that same act in the future.
on the victim, iidoeS not follow that the
The language of Penal Code section 22, crime is one in which evidence of intoxidrafted in 1872 when "specific" and "gen- cation ought,to be considered in determineral" intent were not yet terms of art, is ing whether the defendant had that intent.
somewhat broader than those terms: "No' It is true that in most cases specific intent
act committed by a person while in a state :has come to mean an intention to do a
of voluntary intoxication is less criminal future act or achieve a particular result,
and that assault is appropriately characby reason of his having been in such conditerj;,;~d as a specific intent crime tinder
tion: But whenever the actual existence
this definition. An assault, however, is
of any particula.r purpose, motive, or inequally, well characterized as a general intent is a necessary element to constitute
tent crfme under the definition of general
any particular species or degree of crime,
intent cas an intent merely to do a violent
the jury may take into consideration the
act. Therefore, whatever reality the dis~
fact that the accused was intoxicated at
tin'ction between specific and general intent
the time, in determining the purpose, moma'y have in other contexts, the difference
tive, or intent with which he committed the
is 'chimerical in the case of assault with a
act." , Even this statement of the relevant
deadly weapOn or simple assault. ' Since
policy is no easier to apply to particular
the definitions of both specific intent and
crimes. We are still confronted with the
general intent cover the requisite intent to
difficulty of characterizing the mental elecommit a battery, the decision whether or
ment of a given crime as a particular purnot to "give effect to evidence of intoxicapose, motive, or intent necessary to constitute the offense, or as something less than tion mu'st rest on other considerations.
that to which evidence of intoxication is
not pertinent.
6. Pen.Code § 240 lltovi(1cS: "An assault
is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a
present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of 1Inother."
It was the strong suggestion of intent in
the ordinary usage of the word "attempt"
that was at the basis of this eourt's

A compelling consideration is the effect
of alcohol on human behavior. A signifiremark in People ..J.' Carmen, 36 CaL2!l
701l, 775, 228 1'.2<1 281, 286, that "{o]ne
could not very well 'attempt' or try to
'commit' an injury on the person of
another jf he had no intent to cause any
injury to such other person."
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cant effect of alcohol is to distort judgment
and relax the controls on aggressive and
anti-social impulses. (Beck and Parker,
The Intoxicated Offender-A Problem of
Responsibility (1966), 44 Can.B.Rev. 563,
570-573; Mllelberger, Medico-Legal Aspects of Alcohol Intoxication (1956), 35
Mich.st.B.J. 36, 40-41.)

Alcohol apparent-

ly has less effect on the ability to engage in
simple goal-directed behavior, although it
may impair the efficiency of that behavior.
In other words, a 9,ru1)~ man is capable of
forming an intent to do something simple,
such as strike another, unless he is so drunk
that he has reached the stage of unconsciousness. What he is not as capable as
a sober man of doing is exercising judgment about the social consequences of his
acts or controlling his impulses toward antisocial acts. He is more likely to act rashly
and impulsively and to be susceptible to passion and anger. It would therefore be
anomalous to allow evidence of intoxication
to relieve a man of responsibility for the
crimes of assault with a deadly weapon or
simple assault, which are so frequently committed in just such a manner. As the court
said in Parker v. United States (1966) 123
U.S.App.D.C. 343, 359 F.2d 1009, 1012-1013,
"Whatever ambiguities there' may, be in
distinguishing between specific and general
intent to determine whether drunkenness
constitutes a defense, an offense of this
nature is not one which requires an intent
that is susceptible to negation throligh a
showing of voluntary intoxication."
7. It should be pointed out that the fact
that intent may be inferred from the
defendant's conduct does' not' affect the
nature of the requisite intent. Whether
the intent be merely to do that which was
done or to do a further act or achieve
a particular cOnsequence, thc jury may infer from defendant's rl'cts that defendant
acted with the requisite intent, if such
an inference is warrnnted by the evidence.
As the Court of Appeal said in People
v. J)'anning, supra, 265 Cal.Apll.2d 729,
734 n. 4, 71 Cal.Itptr.641, 044, in discussing whether assault was a specific
or a general intent crime, "The confusion

[4] Those crimes that have traditionally
been characterized as crimes of specific intent are not affected by our holding here.
The difference in mental activity between
formulating an intent to commit a battery
and formulating an intent to commit a battery for the purpose of raping or killing
may be slight, but it is sufficient to justify
drawing a line between them and considering evidence of intoxication in the one
case and disregarding it in the other."
Accordingly, on retrial the court should
not instruct the jury to consider evidence
of defendant's intoxication in determining
whether he committed assault with a deadly
weapon on a peace officer or any of the
lesser assaults included therein. ,People v.
Fanning, supra, 265 Cal.App.2d 729, 71
Cal. Rptr. 641, and any case implying the
contrary are disapproved.
To preclude double' punishment for a
single assault (Pen.Code,§ 654), the trial
court stayed execution of the sentence on
Count I, which carries a maximum penalty
of 15 years (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)),
and ordered that defendant serve' the sentence on Count III, which carries a maximum penalty of 14 years (Pen.Code, §
217). Accordingly, had defendant not appealed, his maximum. term would have been
14 years. To preclude penalizing him for
appealing, the court may not impose a
maximum sentence of more than 14 years if
on retrial he is again found guilty on Connt
I or Count III or both. (People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Ca1.2d 482, 495-497, 35
Cal.Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 677; People v. Ali
(1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281-282, 57 Ca1.Rptr.
seems to 'be, in part at least, traceable
to the rule that the intent may' be inferred from the act.' (People v. l\IcCoy,
25 Ca1.2d 177, 194-195, 153 P.2d 315.)
The fact thnt one clement of It crime may
be inferred from proof of another does
not decrease the number of clements."
In the crimes of simple' assault and as-,
sault with a deadly.weapon, the jury may
infer from defendant's conduct that he'
entertained the necessary intent to commit an injury, Such an inference does
not affect the nature of that intent or
determine what significance should be
accorded to evidence of intoxication.
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348,424 P.2d 932; In re Ferguson (1965)
233 Cal.App.2d 79, 81-82, 43 Cal.Rptr. 325.)
The judgment is reversed.
McCOMB,
PETERS,
TOBRINER,
MOSK, BURKE, and SULLIVAN, JJ.,
concur.

States Supreme Court adopted that decision as constitutionally compelled by confrontation clause of Sixth Amendment and
declared the decision to be fully retroactive, effect of such error was then required
to be judged by federal harmless error
standard rather than by California harmless error standard by California courts.
West's Ann.Cal.Const. art. 6, § 13; U.S.C.
A. Canst. Amend. 6.
2. Criminal Law €=o1169(12)

82 Cal.Rptr. 628
In re Tony Montoya LARA
on Habeas Corpus.
Cr. 13743.

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Dec. 23, 1969.

Petitioner, who had been convicted of
murder and had been given death penalty,
brought habeas corpus proceeding in Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, Mosk,
J., held that where, in murder prosecution
in which death penalty was imposed, prosecuting attorney asked each prospective juror whether he or she could impose death
penalty il} a proper case, and, at conclusion
of examination, prosecuting attorney successfully challenged each prospective juror
who answered in negative a n~w penalty
trial was required.
Writ granted as to penalty trial, remittitur issued in murder prosecution recalled,
judgment imposing death penalty reversed
insofar as it related to penalty, and, in all
other respects, judgment affirmed.
dissented in
Burke and McComb,
part..

n.,

I. Criminal Law €=o1186(4)

Where California Supreme Court previously recognized that admission of those
portions of codefendant's confession, which
implicated defendant, constituted error in
murder prosecution in state court under
California decision, and thereafter United

Where effect of'i-.ny. circumstances
which might otherwise have mitigated impact of confession of defendant was overcome by portions of statement of codefendant implicating defendant, the implication
will be prejudicial to defendant despite defendant's confession, and such situation
may occur when confessing defendant
presents evidence to show that his confession was not freely given, and he also denied its truth on the witness stand. West's
Ann.Cal.Const. art. 6, § 13; U.S.C.A.Const.
Amend. 6.
3. Criminal Law €=ol 169(12)

Error in admitting portions of confession of codefendant implicating defendant
in murder prosecution was not prejudicial
error, where codefendant's confession was
not only evidence placing defendant at
scene of murder, and defendant's own confession -sltpplied that fact very convincingly, and both girl friend and sister of defendant testified to spontaneous, unsolicited confessions defendant made to them
shortly after murder. West's Ann.Cal.
Canst art. 6, § 13; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend.

6.
4. Courts €=oIOO(I)·

While United States Supreme Court
decided that warrantless searches incident
to arrest were not unreasonable within
meaning of Fourth Amendment, and California Supreme Court decided that United
States decision was prospective in operation, special exception would not be carved
out in capital cases to apply the United
States Supreme Court decision retroactively when death penalty was decreed. U.S.
C.A.Const. Amend. 4.

